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671i LERXER P. SllPERlOR COURT l38 U.2d 
[~. 1<'. ~O. UH4S. In Bunk. Mar. 25, 1952.] \ 
m<},!'TY F. LERNEH. l'etitiolH·r. Y. SUPl<~RIOH COUH'l' 01" 
SAX MATEO COCN'rY. Ht'spoudt'nt; CIJAHENCE F. 
I.JEUNER, Real Party in Interest. 
[1] Appeal-Meet-Powers of Trial Court Pending Appeal.-In 
view of COllt' Ch·. Pro(' .• ~ 9-16. dt'claring that whenewr an 
appeal is perf<,dt'd it stll~-'" nll furthm' pro('('l'dings in the 
lower court, an nppl'lll hom II custod~' m'del" ,ll')JI"ives tht' trial 
court of jurisdiction to changl' the custolly statu:; at the time 
of the app<'a1. 
[2] Id.-Effect-Powers of Trial Court Pending Appeal.-After 
trial court loses jurisdiction on perfection of lin appeal from 
a custody order, the eonst'nt of the parties is inf'ffective to rein-
vest such ('ourt with jurisdiction O\'l'r the subject matter of. 
the appeal. 
[3a-3e] Divorce - Custody of Children-Appeal-E1fect.-Where 
di\"orce decrl't~ gave It·gal custody of son to both parties jointly, 
but thE'reafter trial court awarded custody to the dh'orced 
hushand suhject to eoudition that hoy hE' kept in school within 
statE', and the divorced wife appealed, the trial court is with-
out jurisdiction to permit the divorced husband to send the 
bo~' to a school in ullotIlt'r state, since such remo\"al would 
!<ubstantially destroy the custody status at the time the uppeal 
was tllkl·n. in violation of Code Civ. Prof'., § 946. 
[4] Id.-Custody of Children-Essence.-Essl'ne(' of eU5tody of a 
ehild is the companionship of the child and the right to make 
dpcisions regarding his ellre and control, ('ducation, health, 
and religion. 
[5] Id.-Custody of Children-Appeal-E1fect.-Phrase in Code 
Civ. Proe.,.~ 946, that an appeal stays "all further proceedings 
in the court below upon the judgment or ordpr appealed from," 
must be interpreted to include action by 1\ trial court giving 
[IJ See Cal.Jur., Appeal and Error, § 179; Am.Jur., Appeal and 
Error, § 530. 
[3] .JUI·isdiction of h'illl 01' lIpp .. llllh· l'O\H·t ill l"l'sp'!ct of cu,;tod~' 
of ehililr('ll 1)(,I\llin~ uPP"ul from order or decree ill divorce suit, 
llott~ Hi3 A.L.R. 1319. RI,t', nlso, Cal.JuT., DiYoree :lI1t1 Separation. 
~ l·n. 
McK. Dig. References: llJ Appeal and En'm', ~3::n; [:!J Appeal 
!lnt! Enor, ~3~O; [3J).~-10J Divol"l'e, §288; [-11 Divorce, §:!71: 
[6. lllDi\·lJrc(·. §272; l7] Divol'el', ~287: [12J Prohibition, §40; 
P3l DiYorc(', ~ l7.i; [H,18] Di\'ol"cc, § 197; [15,16] Prohibition, 
§ 1; [17J ~!andamus, § 107. 
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.. telllporal'~··' pl'l"Illi~~iOll to tak.· a .. hibl fl'om tllf> ~tatp prn.ling 
npP"'al from rI "l1~t"dy ornl'r. 
[6] ld.-Custody of Children--Jurisdiction. .\ II hllll.zh 11 nHly Iw 
a~sulll"d that a l"alifol'lli;1 "l1"tll,ly .1".'\"1'.' wonlt! ... ·.·pi"e the 
~;lllle !"I'''il''!'! in oth,'1' "tatl'S that fOl'pign C'l1"tody .it'erees rl'-
".·i".· in om' \'\l\lrh, phy"ieal PI"l'Sl'IH'r in n fOI't'ign ;;tatt' of the 
"hil.1 ill\·oh,,.d ill thl' California UP('n'!' would gin· till' foreign 
statl' jUl'i.-didil>ll to d"l'i,[.· for its"lf what ,wtion would bt' ill 
his h,'st intl'l'l'sts. 
[7] ld.-Custody of Children-Modification.-l'ustody decl'ees are 
unin·rsally suhj .. d to 1lI0dification Oil a showillg" of facts which 
I'efjuirr a ehangp in tIl!' (ll'd('l' to protret what the court con-
siders th.' w('lfal'P of the child. 
[8] ld.-Custody of Children-Appeal-Effect.-\Yhill' the para-
lliount conN'rll in eustnd~' proct'pdillgs is the welfare of the 
('hilt!, thl' di\'ol'ct'(l wif" ha» the right and duty, pending appeal 
t'!'Olll an ordt'l' awarding l'ustody of the child to the divorced 
husband on ('ondition that the ehild lll' kl'pt in school within 
statt'. to SlIft·guanl tht' ehil.l until dl't\'rlllination of the appeal; 
nud if she do(':> Hot ngT('1' with tIlt' di\'orced husband's asser-
tion that tilt' IH'st illtl't'{·~ts of tIll' (·hild require his attendance 
nt a tH·hool ollbidl' tIlt' statl', questiolls of the child's educatioll 
nI'l' g-on'!'!wd hy pro\'ision:; of the <li\'ol'l'e deereI'. 
[9] Id. - Custody of Children - Appeal-Effect.-Fnct that trial 
eourt, pt'IHling appt'nl from a custody order, has jurisdiction 
to require a di';or('l'd !tu.,haud to make payments for child 
support (Civ. Code, ~ 137,2) dOl'S not menn thnt it has power 
to j;;SUl' ol'dt'rs which would 1'1'11<11'1' futile the Ilppellate deter-
mination on the merits. 
[10] ld.-Custody of Children-AppeaL-A litigant in a custody 
action is entitled to nppt'llllte review before his rights are 
tinally deterlllined. 
[11] ld.-Custody of Children-Jurisdiction.-An ol'der which so 
disturhs the cu;>tody of n child as to permit hilll to be taken 
out of the :state, peudillg final determination of an appeal from 
u custody order, would he an act in excess of' the jurisdiction 
of the trial court. 
[12] Prohibition-Custody Proceedings.-Prohibition will issue to 
preveut till' trial ('(JUrt fro III t'ntel'ing lin order which will per-
mit a father to take his child Iwyond the court's jurisdiction 
p(·udillg fiual tld(~rlllillatiun o[ the question whether such 
fnther is entitled to the child's custotly. 
[6] gxtraterritorial effect of provision in decree of divorce as 
to custody of child, note, 160 A.L.R. 400. See, also, Cal.Jur., Di-
\'orc(' and Scpal'ation, § 142; Am.Jur., Divorce and Separation, 
~ 688. 
) 
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[13] Divorce-Counsel Fees and Costs.-Policy undcrlying. Civ. 
Code, ~ 137.3, with rpgard to requiring the husband during the 
pendency of a divorce actioll to pay such alllount as lIlay be 
reasonably Il('C('f;sary for costs and attorney's fees, is control-
ling whethl'r the action is one in which a wOllfRn is compelled 
by her former husband to resist by an appeal a proceeding 
brought by him to modify a custody or alimony award, or 
whether the action is one in which she is compelled to seek 
prohibition to prevent improper modification of such awards. 
[14] Id. - Counsel Fees and Costs - Prohibition. - Civ. Code, 
~ 137.3, is not framed to limit its application to actions in 
which the other spouse is a "plaintiff" or "defendant," but 
applies to prohibition proceedings in which the superior court 
is the respondent but the husband, from whom attorney's fees 
and costs are sought, is the real party in interest. 
[15] Prohibition-Nature of Writ.-While the writ of prohibition 
was formerly used by the king's courts to increase their author-
ity at the expense of the ecclesiastical courts, and the lower 
court was thus a party to the litigation in a substantial sense, 
in California practice an application to an appellate court for 
the writ is simply one of several means by which a litigant 
may obtain a review of action or threatened action by a trial 
court. 
[16] Id.-Purpose of Writ.-The objective of a writ of prohibition 
is the same as in an appeal, to prevent the trial court from 
taking action favorable to the other party. 
[17] Mandamus-Counsel Fees.-Counsel fees may be recovered by 
former wife in mandamus proceedings arising out of divorce 
action in which the superior court is the nominal respondent 
but the former husband is real party in interest. (Civ. Code, 
§ 137.3.) 
[18] Divorce - Counsel Fees and Costs - Prohibition.-Supreme 
Court is not the proper forum for determination of counsel 
fees and costs incurred in a prohibition proceeding to restrain 
the trial court from permitting a divorced husband to send 
a child of the divorced parties to a school in another state 
prior to determination of an appeal involving his right to 
the custody of such child; the trial court is better qualified 
than an appellate court to pass on the amount of suit money 
which should be awarded, and is not deprived of jurisdiction 
to award counsel fees because the action is an original proceed-
ing before the appellate court. 
PROCEEDING in prohibition to restrain the Superior 
Court of San Mateo County from making any order which 
would permit temporary removal of a minor child of petitioner 
and her divorced husband from the state prior to final deter-
) 
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mination of an appeal involving the custody of such child. 
Writ granted; petitioner's motion for attorney fees and costs 
denied without prejudice. 
Marvin E. Lewis, Goldstein, Lewis & Barceloux for Peti-
tioner. 
Cosgriff, Carr, McClellan & Ingersoll and Frank V. Kington 
for Real Party in Interest and Respondent. 
TRAYNOR, J.-During their marriage, Clarence and Betty 
Lerner adopted two children, Gerald and Linda. The marriage 
failed, and a final decree of divorce was entered on May 10, 
1948. The decree awarded legal custody of the children to 
Clarence and Betty jointly, and physical custody to Betty 
for the greater part of each year. No appeal was taken from 
the final decree. On May 25, 1950, both parties consented 
to an order modifying the custody provisions of the final 
divorce decree to allow Gerald to attend the Menlo School for 
Boys as a full-time student. 
On March 9, 1951, after application by Clarence, the final 
decree was modified to award custody of Gerald to his father, 
subject to the condition that the boy "be kept enrolled in 
school as at present." Betty promptly appealed from the 
March 9th order and her appeal is presently pending before 
this court. 
On JUly 16, 1951, Clarence served notice that he would 
seek an order from the trial court authorizing him to enter 
Gerald as a student in the Oxford Academy of Individual 
Education, Pleasantville, New Jersey. Court permission for 
removal of the boy was necessary because the March 9th order 
granting custody to Clarence was conditional on Gerald's 
attendance at the Menlo School. The motive for Clarence's 
action is in dispute. Clarence alleges that Gerald cannot 
adjust himself to class instruction and requires individual 
education, that the Menlo School refused to accept him for 
another term,· that educational authorities and a child psy-
chiatrist recommended enrollment in the Oxford Academy, 
and that it will cost Clarence approximately $10,000 annually 
to send the boy to the New Jersey school. Betty asserts, how-
ever, that Gerald is a bright normal boy, that educational 
authorities inform her that it is not only unnecessary but would 
·Pending determination of the prohibition proceeding, however, the 
Menlo School haa accepted the boy. 
) 
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bp hal'lllfni for Geralll to Ilth'nd the Oxford Atademy, and 
that the 1't'al llIotiw for till' boy's rpmoval to New Jersey is 
to tt·ansfl·r him :1,000 mil<,s from Bt'tty. 
On .J uly 23. If);) 1. lit t 1](' Ill'al'illg" on Clarence's Illotion, 
Bt'tty ad"ist'd tlip tt'iHleourt that the filing of the appeal from 
tl)(' l\Iar(·h !lth (,l\stod~· ord<'r had deprived the trial court of 
jurisdil'tion til make furthl'r modifications of the custody pro-
visions of tilt' final divorce tlt'(:r('('. Nevertheless, the trial court 
took till' testimon~' of sevpral witnesses in snpport of Clarence's 
motion. Bt·tty then filed an application with this court for a 
writ of prohibition and. after transfer of the petition to the 
District Court of Appeal. thp aitPl'llative writ issued on August 
10th, and it is still in force. 
T"irtl Oourt ,Jurisd1~ction Pending Appeal 
The first qnestion to bt' determined is whether the trial 
('ourt had jurisdiction to enter any order allowing Gerald 
to leave the state pending apPt'al from the March 9th custody 
order. 
[1] S(,ction ~46 of the Cod!' of Civil Procedure provides: 
~'\Yhellever an appeal is perfet:il'd, as provided in the preced· 
ing f'eetions of this chapter. it stays aU further proceedings 
ill the eonrt below upon the jndgment or order appealed 
frolll. 01' npoll til(' matt!'rs embrac('<l therein .... " It is 
thrrE'fore well I'stablisht>d that an app<'al from a custody order 
depriws thr trial conrt of jnris(lietion to change the custody 
status at tIlt' time of the apllt'al. (Yo.~bllr{) v. Vosburg, 137 
Cal. 4!)~. 49;) 168 P. 694] ; E.r parte Qllcirolo, 119 Cal. 633. 
636 r:i1 P. 9;)61; Browne v. Browne. 60 Cal.App.2d 637, 642 
p·n P.2d 4281; .1foon v. Superior Court, 59 Cal.App.2d 447. 
449 [139 P.2d 84] ; In re Browning, 108 Cal.App. 503, 506 
[291 P. 6501; see 2 Cal..hIr. 4]6-418; 27 C.J.S., Divorce, 
§ 324f. ) "An app('al from a juilgment or order would be 
futilE', and this court would be deprived of jurisdiction if 
pE'nding the appeal th(' jndgm('nt or order appealed from could 
be modifiecl or rhangrd into ~omethillg radically diffrrent by a 
snbse<]lIE'nt O!·dPr of. th<' tl'illl I'onrt." (Vnxburn v. VoSbltrg. 
Mtpra. 137 Cal. 493. 496.) [2] The lof0;8 of jurisdiction is so 
I'omph'te that {'wn flll' COIlf't'ut of th(' parties is ineff!'cth'e to 
reiuv('st tht' trial romt with jurisdiction over the sUbjr.ct 
mattl'r of the app!'al. (Kinard v . . J ordan, 175 Cal. 13, 16 [164 
P.8941.) 
[3a] ClarPlwe contendf' that thE' trial court ma~· Jl(~vprtheless 
allow "temporary" remo\'al to ~t'w .Tersey pending appeal, 
-) 
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relying upon the provision in section 946 that "the court below 
may proceed upon any other matter embraced in the action and 
not affected by the order appealed from." Clarence points 
out that the "order appealed from" is the order of March 9tb 
modifying the final decree by transferring eustody of Gerald 
from Betty to Clarence. He states that his application to 
('uroll the boy in the New Jersey school "has absolutely no 
I'elatiollship" to the cU!'Itody order, but would merely change 
the locale of the 1:$oy's education from the Menlo School to 
New Jersey. 
The contention that the removal proceeding is not upon 
a matter embraced within the custody appeal disregards 
the factual setting of this action. At the time Betty perfected 
her appeal from the modification order of March 9th, the 
parents had joint legal custody and Gerald was enrolled 
full time at Menlo School, where Betty wished him to be 
educated, where she could visit him, and where she could 
invoke the protection of California courts to enforce the 
provisions of the final divorce decree. [4] The essence of cus-
tody is the companionship of the child and the right to make 
decisions regarding his care and control, education, health, and 
religion. (See Roche v. Roche 25 Cal.2d 141, 144 [152 P.2d 
999].) [3b] If the ('hild could be removed 3,000 miles to a 
school in New Jersey, chosen by Clarence against Betty's 
will, the provisions of the custody decree favorable to Betty 
would be vitiated. The proposed New Jersey order, in fact, 
would be more severe from Betty's viewpoint than the order , 
appealed from. Under the March 9th order Betty lost legal 
cllstody, but the court at least ordered that the boy remain 
at a California school where Betty could visit him. The New 
Jersey order, by contrast, would effectively end visitation 
rights. Although the removal is labelled "temporary," it 
,,"ould substantially destroy the custody status at the time 
the appeal was taken, in clear violation of the provisions of 
!;pction 946. (Vosburg v. Vosburg, supra, 137 Cal. 493, 495.) 
[5] Moreover, an examination of the recognition given 
custody decrees ill other states demonstrates that the phrase 
in section 946, "all further proceedings in the court below 
upon the judgment or order appealed from," must be in-
terpreted to include action by a trial court giving "temporary" 
permission to take a child from the state pending appeal from 
a custody order. [6] Although it may be assumed that the 
California decree would receive the same respect in other 
states that foreign custody decrees receive in our courts (see 
682 LERNER v. SUPERIOR COURT [380.2d 
Sampsell v. Superior Court, 32 Ca1.2d 763, 779 [197 P.2d 
739] ), the physical presence of the child would give the foreign 
state jurisuictiou to d<.'cide for itself what action woplU be in 
his best interests. (Sampsell v. Superior Court, supra, 32 
Ca1.2d 763, 779; Foster v. Foster, 8 Ca1.2d 719, 726 [68 P.2d 
719] ; Titcomb v. Superior Court, 220 Cal. 34, 39 [29 P.2d 
206] ; see In re B's Settlement, 1 Ch. 54 (1940); 160 A.L.R. 
408; 17 Am.Jur. 521.) [7] Custody decrees are universally 
subject to modification upon a showing of facts that require 
a change in the order to protect what the foreign court con-
siders the welfare of the child. Even if the foreign forum 
eventually follows the California decision, protracted litiga-
tion is meanwhile inevitable. Thus, in the Foster proceedings 
the South Dakota decree was eventually enforced in this 
state, but only after the parent disobeying the South Dakota 
decree kept the children in this state for three years of trial· 
and appellate litigation. (See Foster v. Foster, 8 Cal.2d 719 
[68 P.2d 719] ; Foster v. Foster, 5 Cal.2d 669 [55 P.2d 1175] ; 
Foster v. Superior Court, 4 Cal.2d 125 [47 P.2d 701] ; Foster 
v. Superior Court, 4 Cal.App.2d 466 [41 P.2d 187].) Again, 
in Langan v. Langan, 150 F.2d 979, the father disregarded 
the provisions of a California decree and fled with the child 
to Maryland. The mother followed him and was awarded 
custody by the Mary~and court but the father moved on to 
the District of Columbia before the mother could obtain physi-
cal custody of the child. Despite the conduct of the father, 
the District of Columbia court awarded custody to the father 
on the ground of changed circumstances. The father thus 
shopped from state to state until he found a court willing to 
award him custody. There are many other instances where 
parents violated court orders forbidding removal of a minor 
from the state with impunity. (See In re Memmi, 80 Cal.App. 
2d 295, 300 [181 P.2d 885] ; Cook v. Cook, 135 F.2d 945, 946; 
Gaunt v. Gaunt, 160 Okla. 195, 196 [16 P.2d 579] ; Crowell 
v. Crowell, 184 Ore. 467, 472 [198 P.2d 992]; Haynie v. 
Hudgins, 122 Miss. 838, 853 [85 So. 99] ; White v. White, 77 
N.H. 26, 30 [86 A. 353] j Commonwealth ex rel. Rogers v. 
Daven, 298 Pa. 416, 423 [148 A. 524] ; Goldsmith v. Salkey, 
131 Tex. 139, 146 [112 S.W.2d 165, 116 A.L.R. 1293] ; Jones 
v. Bowman, 13 Wyo. 79, 89 [77 P. 439] ; People ex rel. Wagner 
v. Torrence, 94 Colo. 47,51 [27 P.2d 1038] ; Helton v. Crawley, 
241 Iowa 296 [41 N.W.2d 60]; Ex parte Peddicord, 269 
Mich. 142, 145 [256 N.W. 833].) We do not mean to imply 
that the foregoing decisions were incorrectly decided. They 
) 
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are cited only to demonstrate that Betty cannot be adequately 
protected during her appeal if the trial court may enter orders 
allowing her child to be taken from the state. 
[8] Clarence contends that the trial court "has power to 
make all necessary orders needed for the child's welfare and 
is not to be blocked by an appeal based on mere partisan in-
terest and desire." This contention assumes the question to 
be decided by the appeal: did the trial court correctly decide 
that the status of the child's custody as of March 9th was not 
in his best interests Y The paramount concern in custody pro-
ceedings is the walfare of the child (Puckett v. Puckett, 21 
Ca1.2d 833, 839 [136 P.2d 1]), but Betty has the right and 
duty to safeguard Gerald until determination of the appeal. 
Clarence asserts that the best interests of Gerald require his 
attendance at the New Jersey school, but Betty does not 
agree and, until custody is taken from her and the order 
affirmed on appeal, questions of the child '8 education are 
governed by provisions of the final divorce decree as modified 
by the consent order. It may be noted that if extraordinary 
circumstances requiring protection of the child during the 
appeal arise, application may be made to the appellate court 
for appropriate relief. (See Gantner v. Gantner, post, 
p.691 [242 P.2d 329].) 
[9] Clarence invokes decisions to the effect that pending 
appeal a trial court has jurisdiction to require a father to 
make payments for child support. (Civ. Code, § 137.2; DixO'1/, 
v. Dixon, 216 Cal. 443,444 [14 P.2d 498].) The fact that a 
trial court has the power to protect the child during the appeal 
by continuing the natural obligation of a father to support 
his child does not mean that it has the power to issue orders 
that would render futile the appellate determination on the 
merits. (Vo,~burg v. Vosburg, 137 Cal. 493, 496 [68 P. 694].) 
[3e] Clarence next contends that any order affecting Ger-
aId's education is not a matter embraced in the appeal from 
the March 9th order, on the ground that Betty consented to the 
Menlo School provision in the final decree and a consent order 
cannot be appealed. (See cases collected in 2 Cal.Jur. 225.) 
The record does not indicate that the May 25th consent, as 
adopted in the March 9th decree, waived Betty's rights of 
physical custody for more than one semester, and there is noth-
ing to show that Betty ever consented at any time that the 
child could be enrolled in any school other than the Menlo 
School. In any event, Betty has filed a valid appeal from that 
part of the March 9th order awarding custody to Clarence, 
684 LER!-lER I'. SUPERIOR COURT [380.2d 
and that appeal would be undermined by an order allowing 
the child to be taken from the state. 
Clarence contends that the appeal did not operate to 
stay the New Jersey order on the ground that Betty had 
voluntarily delivered the boy to the Menlo School before per-
fecting her appeal. Clarence relies on In re McK~an, 82 Cal. 
App. 580. 584 [256 P. 226], where the mother did not appeal 
until after execution of the order appealed from, which re-
quired her to give up custody to the father. The court prop-
erly refused to issue habeas corpus to return the child to the 
mother, on the ground that under section 946 the appeal 
stayed only future action by the trial court and did not undo 
action taken by the parties before the appeal. In re Siddall, 
143 Cal. 313, 315 [76 P. 1115] ; see In re BrO'W'lting, 108 Cal. 
App. 503, 507 [291 P. 650].) The McKean decision is in-
applicable here, since Betty enrolled the boy in the Menlo 
School pursuant to the May 25th modification of the final 
decree, and not in obedience to the March 9th decree, the 
subject of the present appeal. 
[10] A litigant in a custody action is entitled to appellate 
review before his rights are finally determined. If the ap-
pellant is not protected from adverse acti~n by the trial court 
that would destroy the fruits of his appeal, the right of appeal 
is illusory. In contending that the trial court can permit 
removal of the children pending appeal, Clarence in effect 
contends that custody orders should be immediately executed 
and not stayed by appeal. The statutes and decisions of this 
state are opposed to this contention, although some states 
have a contrary rule. (See Scheffers v. Scheffers, 241 Iowa 
1217 [44 N.W.2d 676, 679].) 
[11] In summary, at the time Betty perfected her appeal, 
IIhe had custody of Gerald under a decree providing that the 
boy should attend the Menlo School. An order which so 
disturbs the custody of the child as to permit him to be taken 
out of this state, pending final determination of the appeal, 
would be an aet in excess of the jurisdiction of the trial court. 
(VoJlbllrg v. VOJlbllrg, 81tpra.; see State ex rel. Ca.~h v. District 
COltrt. 58 Mont. 316, 318 [195 P. 549] ; Nolan v. Nolan, 257 
Ill.App. 401, 403; cases collected in 163 A.L.R. 1320; 3 Am.Jur. 
192; 27 C.J.S., Divorce, § 324f.) [12] The writ of prohibition 
may therefore issue to prevent the trial court from entering 
the New Jersey· order. (Fosfer v. Superior COl(rt, 4 Ca1.2d 
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On St'ptembf'l' 14, 19;31, Betty applied to the District Court 
of ApPt'al for attorney fees and costs incurred in the pro-
hibition proct't'ding. The application will be considered as 
addressed to this cOllrt after the hearing was granted following 
the District COllrt decision. Betty alleges that she does not 
ha ve the financial resources to prosecute the prohibition pro-
('(-'cding, that Clarence has a financial worth of $1,000,000, 
and that he has a yearly income of $100,000. 
'file petition for a writ of prohibition was filed July 31, 1951, 
and the alternative writ issued on August 10, 1951. Insofar 
as the present appli.cation is for counsel fees for services per-
formed before September 14th, the date of the application, 
the motion must be denied. (Warner v. Warner, 34 Cal.2d 
838,840 [215 P.2d 20].) The application for services after 
that date, however, may be granted if the statute governing 
allowance of attorney ft'es applies to original proceedings in 
prohibition. 
[13] Civil Code, section 137.3, enacted in 1951, provides 
that, "during the pendency of any action for divorce ... the 
court may order the husband . . . to pay such amount as may 
be reasonably necessary for the cost of maintaining or defend-
ing the action and for attorney's fees." Section 137.3 is a 
recodification of the first sentence of former Civil Code, section 
137. It was settled under section 137 that the phrase therein, 
"when an action for divorce is pending," embraced many 
diverse proceedings growing out of the divorce action and 
arising after entry of the final decree. (Wilson v. Wilson, 
33 Ca1.2d 107, 115 [199 P.2d 671] (proceeding to enforce 
distribution of community property) ; Reynolds v. Reynolds, 
21 Ca1.2d 580, 585 [134 P.2d 251] (modification of allowance 
for child support) ; Lamborn v. Lamborn, 190 Cal. 794, 796 
r~n4 P. 862] (motion to modify alimony) ; Grannis v. Superior 
COllrt, 143 Cal. 630, 633 [77 P. 647] (motion to set aside final 
(lcl'ree undt'l' Code Civ. Proc., § 473) ; Kohn v. Kahn, 95 Cal. 
App.2d 722, 724 [214 P.2d 80] (construction of property 
settlement) ; Parker v. Parker, 22 Cal.App.2d 139, 142 [70 P.2d 
100:3] (mandamus to enter judgment for delinquent alimony) ; 
Moore v. Gosbey, 130 Cal.App. 70, 73 [19 P.2d 995] (motion 
to modify. alimony, made 10 years after final decree]; see 
cases collected in 15 A.L.R.2d 1270.) 
On principle ,there is no difference between actions in which 
a woman is compelled by her former husband to resist by an 
appeal a proceeding brought by him to modify a custody or 
) 
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alimony award and actions in which she is compelled to seek 
prohibition to prevent improper modification of such awards. 
I n either ca~ she 'may be nnable to retain counsel to represent 
her, and the policy underlying section 137.3 and the cases 
above cited are controlling. 
[14] In maintaining that section 137.3 does not apply to 
prohibition proceedings, Clarence first contends that Betty can 
recover suit money only when he is the other party to the 
litigation, and that here the respondent is the superior court. 
The statute does not support this contention. Section 137.3 
is not framed to limit its application to actions in which the 
other spouse is a "plaintiff" or "defendant." Instead, it 
applies during the "PElndency of any action for divorce" and 
payments are to be made by the "husband." Moreover, 
the adverse party in the present proceeding is clearly Clarence, 
the "real party in interest," and not the superior court, the 
nominal respondent. The same attorneys represent Clarence 
and the respondent. The prohibition action is directed against 
Clarence, since Betty's success would preclude the trial court ' 
from making the custody order that he requests. [15] In the 
early development of the writ of prohibition, it is true, the 
writ was used by the king's courts to increase their authority 
at the expense of the ecclesiastical courts (1 Holdsworth, His-
tory of English Law, 3d ed., pp. 229, 594) and the lower 
court was thus a party to the litigation in a substantial sense. 
In California practice, however, an application to an appellate 
court for the writ is simply one of several means by which a 
litigant may obtain a review of action or threatened action 
by a trial court. (See 36 Cal.L.Rev. 75, 101-105; 23 So. Cal. 
L.Rev. 530, 533-537.) [16] The objective is the same as in 
an appeal, to prevent the trial court from taking action favor-
able to the other party. Thus the Rules on Appeal recognize 
the adversary character of prohibition proceedings by provid-
ing that the petition for the writ must disclose the name of 
the real party in interest (Rule 56 (a) ), that points and au-
thorities must be served upon him (Rule 56(b», and that he 
may demur or answer to the petition (Rule 56 (c) ). [17] Fur-
ther, it is established that counsel fees may be recovered in 
mandamus proceedings in which the superior court is the nomi-
nal respondent. (Parker v. Park.er, 22 Cal.App.2d 139, 142 
[70 P.2d 1003].) -
Clarence relies on McCarthy v. Superior Court, 65 Cal.App. 
2d 42, 43 [149 ·P.2d 871], holding that a successful applicant 
for a writ of prohibition cannot recover costs against the 
, , 
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state under Code of Civil Procedure, section 1095. The Mc-
Carthy case would be in point only if Betty attempted to 
recover counsel fees from the state or the Superior Court. 
Clarence also invokes Havemeyer v. Superior Court, 84 Cal. 
327,372 [24 P. 121, 18 Am.St.Rep. 192, 10 L.R.A. 627], which 
held that the real party in interest should receive notice of the 
prohibition matter by being served with copies of the petition 
and being given a reasonable time to appear. The record shows 
that Clarence received ample notice and filed an answer to the 
petition. Nothing in the Havemeyer case supports Clarence's 
assertion that any order requiring him to pay counsel fees 
would be "without due process." . 
No reason thus appears why the fact that the superior 
court is the nominal respondent in this proceeding bars an 
award of attorney fees against the real party in interest 
under section 137.3. 
[18] Clarence contends finally that the Supreme Court 
is not the proper forum for thili! proceeding. This contention 
must be sustained. Assuming that we have jurisdiction to 
entertain an application for counsel fees, as a power neces-
sarily incident to our original jurisdiction to issue the writ 
of prohibition, we should not pass upon an application in-
volving questions of fact on the basis of the printed record and 
affidavits when a more satisfactory alternative exists. 
In Parker v. Parker, 22 Cal.App.2d 139 [70 P .2d 1003], the 
trial court awarded the wife counsel fees during the pendency 
of mandamus proceedings within the original jurisdiction of 
the District Court of Appeal. This procedure has many ad-
vantages. The trial court, with the parties before it for 
examination, is better qualified than the appellate court to 
pass on the amount of suit money, if any, that should be 
awarded. (See Bobbitt v. Bobbitt, 297 Ky. 28, 29 [178 S.W.2d 
986] ; Craig v. Craig, 115 Va. 764, 765 [80 S.E. 507].) 
The trial court is not deprived of jurisdiction to award 
counsel fees because the action is an original proceeding before 
t.he appellate court. The decision whether the peremp-
tory writ should issue is only a part of the whole litigation 
betwt'en Clarence and Betty on the custody matter. In an 
analogous situation of an appeal from a custody or alimony 
order, the lower court retains power to order payment of 
connsel fees to enable the wife to prosecute her appeal, and 
such order is not considered in excess of the trial court's 
jurisdiction as a "further proceeding in the court below upon 
the judgment or order appealed from." (Code Civ. Proe., 
) 
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§ 946; Reilly v. Reilly, 60 Cal. 624, 626; DeLeshe v. DeLeshe, 
80 Cal.App.2d 517, 518 [181 P.2d 931].) Like a stay on 
appea1. the alternatiye writ protects the moving party and 
the appellate ('ourt by maintaining the status quo pending 
decision by the appellate court. It does not deprive the trial 
{'ourt of jurisdiction to determine that both litigants are 
fairly represented. 
U nller the cireumstances of this case, Betty should not 
be penalized because her application was erroneously made 
to the appellate court. Accordingly, the denial of her motion 
for attorney fees will be without prejudice to application 
to the trial court for attorney fees and costs incurred since 
the date of the motion, September 14, 1951. 
The motion for attorney fees and costs is denied without 
prejudice. Let the peremptory writ of prohibition issue as 
prayed. 
Gibson, C . • T., Shenk, J., Edmonds, J., Carter, J., Schauer, J., 
and Spence, J., concurred. 
[So F. Xo. 18512. In Bank. }lar. 25, 1952.] 
VALLEJO GANTNER, Petitioner, ". SUPERIOR COURT 
OF THE CITY AND COUNTY OF SAX FRANCISCO, 
Respondent; NEILMA BAILLIEU GANTNER, Real 
Part~· in Interest. 
[1] Divorce-Custody of Children-Appeal-Eft'ect.-While an ap-
peal by divorced hUtiband from an order im'olving the custody 
of children of th~ divorced parties is pending, the trial court 
lal!ks jurisdiction to enter an order permitting the divorced 
wife to take the children to a foreign country for a "tempo-
rary" vacation, since such order would be a proceeding on a 
matter embraced in the order appealed f1'oll1. (Code Civ. 
Proc., § 946.) 
PROCEEDIXG in prohibition to restrain the Superior 
Court of the City and County of San Francisco from entering 
any order allowing temporary removal of minor children of 
petitioner from jurisdiction prior to final determination of 
proceeding brought by him to determine custody provisions of 
n final divorce judgment. Writ granted. 
flJ See Cal.Jur., Divorce and Separation, ~ 141. 
McK. Dig. Reference: [1] Divorce, § 288. 
